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The military is continuously evaluating the measures of effectiveness of its actions against the highly adaptive insurgent. Because this war is not fought on the traditional battlefield, and is instead waged in a population, there is a need to prioritize efforts toward strengthening the civil-military connection. Leveraging indigenous military forces will serve to both narrow the divide with this population and will relieve the strain on the U.S. military. A rededicated information operations campaign targeting both the sanctuary of the insurgency and the American public will work to discredit the insurgent's actions and will bolster the determination of the people to stay behind the effort of a long war. The importance of human intelligence cannot be underestimated. A program that has been long neglected, there is concern that this valuable source of information is still not getting the attention it warrants. Finally, the greatest strength of the American military force is not its technology; it is people. This paper will argue that giving the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine the mental tools to make correct decisions in this complex environment is essential in gaining the edge on this enemy.

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<u>Maintaining Our Priorities: Transforming a Force for the Counterinsurgency War</u>


by


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LT / USN



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.




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**10 October 2006**


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**Abstract**

*Maintaining Our Priorities: Transforming a Force for the Counterinsurgency War*

The military is continuously evaluating the measures of effectiveness of its actions against the highly adaptive insurgent. Because this war is not fought on the traditional battlefield, and is instead waged in a population, there is a need to prioritize efforts toward strengthening the civil-military connection. Leveraging indigenous military forces will serve to both narrow the divide with this population and will relieve the strain on the U.S. military. A rededicated information operations campaign targeting both the sanctuary of the insurgency and the American public will work to discredit the insurgent's actions and will bolster the determination of the people to stay behind the effort of a long war. The importance of human intelligence cannot be underestimated. A program that has been long neglected, there is concern that this valuable source of information is still not getting the attention it warrants. Finally, the greatest strength of the American military force is not its technology; it is people. This paper will argue that giving the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine the mental tools to make correct decisions in this complex environment is essential in gaining the edge on this enemy.

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Clausewitz in *On War* states "war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case." This is further expounded upon to say that "its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity" where the three parts mainly concern the people, the commander and his army, and the government.[1] As with many Clausewitz references, much time could be spent discussing the exact meaning, but in its distilled form there is a rather profound statement in terms of how we plan and fight our wars. On the surface wars may look very similar, but a closer inspection is required to find the driving force behind the conflict. Careful attention must be given in particular to the people involved to develop a complete understanding of how and why they fight. People are the key on both sides of war and throughout the trinity where they weigh in as a factor in all three parts.

The United States has long taken itself in the wrong direction in fighting the war against an insurgency where there exists a perplexing enemy that has continually adapted to sophisticated pressure. As the joint force moves toward interdependence across the services there has been a greater burden placed on technology to gain the edge on the battlefield. Military budgets that are feeling the strain of nearly five years of war are further tensioned by the requirement to field state-of-the-art weapons systems. The cost of leveraging technology has come at a steep price whereby the size of the force has been compromised to support the budget shortfalls. As this process takes place, there is an even greater concern in realizing that the structure and systems the military has purchased, and must train to, have served to further distance the joint force from being able to take the fight to the enemy. The argument of this paper will show that our commitment to a technology-centric lean force structure has drawn us away from the ability to address the insurgent threat. A renewed application of

effort is required toward winning the hearts and minds of people through emphasis on time-tested effective principles in counterinsurgency warfare.

**Missing the Mark in Counterinsurgency Warfare**

First off, what is meant by a lean force structure as it's used in the context of the thesis statement? This is not meant to say that the Army intends on shrinking the size of the total force. Indeed, Congress has actually mandated an expansion of 30,000 troops, and the active component is in the process of a transformation that will in the end have 42 combat brigades.[2] However, despite these efforts, the Army will still be too small to field the necessary force required to quell the threat of an insurgency.[3] In fact, defense officials have balked at the notion of spending more money on expanding the force as it would come at the expense of creating cuts in other defense programs where technology comes at a premium. This lack of depth makes it difficult for the security forces to have more than a passing effect.[4] A quelled insurgency will quickly move to reestablish its strength when a security force moves on to another area of immediate interest.[5] Where the budget priority should focus on further expanding the force, the fiscal funds of the Army are instead pulled in three conflicting directions: fielding the force required to fight the war, transforming the force to a new brigade structure, and upgrading the force technology with future combat systems.

The United States has placed itself in a precarious position in Iraq. Where history is colored by wars such as Vietnam, expansion, at least in the eyes of the American public, is equated to be a drawn-out war with heavy casualties. On the other hand, we could lose the war outright if we don't resource the necessary personnel. History offers warnings that the insurgency we are fighting in Iraq is now taking on the characteristics that spell an impending defeat: there is a withdrawal of domestic and international support, a loss of

control over population and territory, and a loss of coercive power.[6]  Opportunity to field the requisite number of troops has now passed as public sensitivity to the issue of an extended war and an overused force now make it difficult to bring the needed forces to the field to remove the insurgency.

A second point in this thesis highlights our over-dependence on technology.  Rather than assessing a threat to come up with the best way to defeat it, the tendency is to evaluate it in terms of how best to apply advanced technology.  Such is the case with improvised explosive devices where technology in electro-countermeasures and armor improvements are seen as the solution rather than focused efforts against bomb manufacturers, their logistics, and support structure.[7]  Furthermore, technology is often misinterpreted to be representative of modern warfare where it is the principles of war that have remained constant throughout time.[8]  The war of the insurgent is fought on a very basic level.  It is a war of ideology and people.  In using technology we are often using the blunt instrument of kinetic and conventional war.  With the advent of greater precision in warfare, many alternatives that are better suited are often overlooked with the knowledge that we can act with preemption and forced entry strike.[9]  To fight the insurgent, however, there is a need to shape the fight far in advance by working through the people he makes contact with and relies upon to sustain his infrastructure.

Smaller, tailored, and scaleable are all commonly used words in the joint military world where there is the assumption that technology affords economy of force by replacing personnel with more efficient means of engaging the enemy.[10]  In the war against the insurgent where "tactical success guarantees nothing,"[11] technology offers little edge beyond

the firefight.  In order to get to the root cause of an insurgency, there is a requirement for a more systemic approach where cause and effect are pursued in parallel with equal emphasis.

**How the Enemy Fights: Factors Force, Space, and Time**

Our enemy in an insurgency does not seek out the large decisive battle.  An argument could be made that we will not see another sensational act such as that on 9/11 simply because this would only serve to unite those outside the caliphate in a common cause of its destruction.  This is what happened in Afghanistan, where the loss of their fundamentalist state forced the dispersal of the insurgency from its stronghold to new regional fronts such as that in Iraq.[12]  In terms of force, the insurgency now chooses to avoid big battles and instead seeks to fight what Taber calls the war of the flea, where the insurgent "bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him."[13]  Under the principles of war, this would be termed as economy of force, whereby the insurgent knows he does not have the capacity in terms of size of force or firepower to fight the large battle.  Often labeled as a "have not" because he does not possess the economic or military power such as that of the United States, the insurgent fights the war in way that capitalizes on his strengths to mitigate any form of military weakness.[14]

Another closely related factor is that of space.  The counterinsurgency force in Iraq is charged with maintaining the security of a vast area.  In conventional terms this requires a large number of troops and extensive resources.[15]  An insurgent, on the other hand, is not required to maintain areas and in fact finds strength in having the freedom to move throughout the population.[16]  In Afghanistan there existed numerous remote areas that offered isolation where the insurgency could carry out business without interference of a policing force.  Out of necessity the insurgency was forced to move from these isolated

positions to become more dispersed as the coalition showed its capability to strike from great distance on short notice. Now in scenarios such as Iraq, the insurgent is "hidden in plain sight" as he travels throughout the country and crosses porous borders all the while sustained by the population he has coerced for help or is sympathetic to his cause.[17]

The protracted nature of counterinsurgency war also highlights the importance of the factor time. Attrition, in its common usage, is most often referred to in terms of physical casualties inflicted on the enemy. In the case of guerilla warfare, however, the attrition is of public and political support for the action against the insurgency which tends to wane over time.[18] The very nature of this form of conflict to be a drawn out tends to favor the enemy. As political leadership changes are made on the side of the counterinsurgency government there is a tendency to have a change of interest in backing the effort. Such was the case in El Salvador where the funding needed to back vital programs often proved to be unreliable.[19] Since the insurgent is unable to effect decisive victories through the large battle, they instead choose to wait out the political decisions that follow the anxiety of a long conflict.

All three factors of force, space, and time are continually at odds with one another in this type of conflict. As more force is applied there is a tendency for the enemy to simply disperse and take sanctuary again inside the population. As this happens, it becomes more difficult to root out the infrastructure of the insurgency and the protracted nature of the war continues.

**The Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency**

A convenient method of facilitating discussion of both problems and solutions of a counterinsurgency effort is provided by a series of paradoxes which the Army has adopted into a revision to their field manual. The first of these states "the more you protect your

force, the less secure you are."[20]  One of the key tenets of counterinsurgency requires the interaction of the force with the population to both win their hearts and minds as well as to deny sanctuary to the insurgent which employs the population as his strength.  By staying behind walls, such as that in the Green Zone,[21] there are actually two counterproductive effects.  First, there is psychological barrier placed between the civilian population and the security forces.[22]  This impediment will lead to further development of lack of trust that will compromise the passing of information and intelligence.  Secondly, though the security of the force itself would increase, the populace would be left without protection from coercion, exploitation, and violence of the insurgency.

The enemy is incredibly adept at exploiting propaganda in favor of his cause.  This strength is reflected in a second paradox which states "the more force is used, the less effective it is."[23]  Because of the close proximity of the insurgent to the civilian population, there is a need to strike the balance between the aggressive pursuit of threats to stability and protecting the liberties of the people.[24]  While force is easily justified against an enemy that intent on doing harm, every effort must be taken to protect the public.  This is extremely difficult in an insurgency environment where law-abiding citizens and the enemy are both close together and are not easily distinguishable from one another.  The protracted counterinsurgency contrasts greatly from the first stages of a conventional war where accidental damage and suffering are seemingly more acceptable under the premise that effort is taken to minimize collateral damage.  However, as time wears on and the war evolves into an insurgency, there is a shift in acceptability of this damage.  As this takes place, the polarizing effects of the insurgent's superior information campaigns achieve victory by creating the need for extensive public damage control.

One of the principles of joint operations maintains the purpose of the offensive is to achieve, retain, and exploit the initiative.[25]  This principle holds relevance in counterinsurgencies; however, it must be balanced against a paradox that says a tactic working this week may not work the next.[26]  An often underestimated strength of the insurgent is his ability to learn and adapt to pressures in a quick manner giving what is perceived to be a moving target for the coalition force.  In order to maintain this initiative there is an ever-present need to think ahead of the insurgent.

Another closely related paradox could be derived form the joint operational principle of surprise.  The paradox states "sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction."[27]  With the purpose of surprise to be able to strike where the enemy is not prepared,[28] there often exists situations in counterinsurgency warfare where opportunities to inflict damage to the enemy must be passed over to shape the battlespace environment.  Both this and the previous paradox have developed through the enemy's exploitation of the predictability of conventional warfare mindset.  The American way of war is to seek the quick and decisive battle in which we typically prevail through superior technology and force.  However, individually disadvantaged in terms of firepower, the insurgent sways the balance in his favor by keeping the opposing force off center.

**Realigning Our Efforts Against the Insurgency**

In the methodology of the security objectives outlined in The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, there are the familiar terms of "clear" and "hold"[29] which were derived from late-stage Vietnam War policies.  Application of these methods, however, does not coincide with the overall purpose in today's strategy.  Where force and technology have been ineffective, people in contact with people, developing relations and understanding of culture,

customs, language, and socio-economic issues is the key. Ultimately, working backward from the objective it can be discerned how the application of resourceful military personnel, and not necessarily military force, would best suit achieving the goals. Future Combat System solutions of class II unmanned aerial vehicles, armed robotic vehicles, and intelligent munitions[30] would need to be replaced by human interaction with the populace.

To summarize the analysis there have been identified a number of enemy strengths and weaknesses. Insurgencies maintain strength in their ability to use the local population as a sanctuary where they freely roam vast areas of space. The insurgent enjoys a nimble capability to move about an undefined battlefield and can pass with little restriction across borders. He is not limited by rules of engagement and has proven to be skilled at adapting his tactics to counter seemingly more capable firepower. While occupying forces seek to end the war quickly and decisively, the insurgent maintains the far easier task of protracting the war with no restrictions placed on time to achieve an objective. In terms of weakness, the insurgency lacks individually more capable firepower and has loosely affiliated command and control structures. Though the population is considered a strength, it is at the same time a potential for weakness as it can be alienated by excessive brutality on behalf of the insurgency.

Past efforts of the coalition in Iraq have missed the mark by attempting to counter the insurgency predominantly through force rather than dedicating resources toward the center of gravity.[31] Bringing superior technology and firepower to the battlefield has allowed for numerous localized victories, but this effort has left intact the enemy infrastructure in which they thrive. From the above list of enemy strengths, the operational center of gravity lies with the population where the insurgent enjoys sanctuary through intimidation and coercion.

With this idea in mind there is now a need to determine the direct and indirect methods by which this insurgent center of gravity can be weakened.

Military force will remain essential in counterinsurgency warfare where there is a need to create contact in volume with a large population spread throughout a wide area. While the other portions of national power cannot be neglected, and, in fact, are essential to the process, it is the military that will be able to provide personnel and resources on the scale for which they are required. Focusing on the military, there are two important capabilities that must be used in concert with one another: firepower and manpower. An enemy will not willingly give up ground without a fight, and an insurgency is no different. In its direct application, military force will be required to unseat an enemy from his sanctuary in the population. After this takes place, indirect application of the military will become more important in establishing a holding force that can set the conditions of prolonged security. Similar principles were applied in General Abrams' clear and hold strategy used in the later part of the Vietnam War.[32]

The method of establishing this holding force should not be supplied solely by the occupying military. Using another paradox, "the host nation's doing something tolerably is better than our doing it well," there is acknowledgement than an occupying military force is limited in its capability to combat an insurgency. This is for two reasons. First, no matter how well intentioned the purpose of the force may be, there is still a degree of legitimacy and understanding that must be supplied by the indigenous connection. General Pershing applied this principle in the Philippines where he did not attempt to conquer the Moros solely through the use of military force; rather he attained their respect by developing an understanding for their culture, customs, and society.[33] A second reason for using the

indigenous force comes from the protracted nature of this type of warfare where the manpower resources of the occupying force will quickly be exhausted and must be relieved. Forces of the occupied country in the form of military, paramilitary, and police should be leveraged to provide the bulk of the manpower requirements.

A lesson derived from Vietnam was the fact that it was extremely difficult to root out the Vietcong without the help of the villagers.[34] Although the civilian population would have assisted in removing the intimidating elements, they often found it difficult to overcome the threat of retaliation. When the villagers took it upon themselves to turn in the enemy, they and their families would suffer at the hands of another insurgent.[35] This problem could be alleviated by using indigenous manpower supplemented by occupying forces to mend the disconnect between the populace and the security force. The Combined Action Program used by the Marine Corps in Vietnam has proven these principles can work when properly applied through a competent staff. Under this model, a Marine rifle squad was joined with a South Vietnamese militia platoon that together would train and provide security for villages in which they lived. [36]

While military force is traditionally thought of as more of the direct method of attacking an insurgency, Dr. Kilcullen states it should be considered only as a means of taking the insurgency "off the boil."[37] By supporting indigenous forces the effectiveness is multiplied by the indirect assistance it lends toward attacking the enemy center of gravity. The insurgent's sanctuary becomes smaller when indigenous security forces are embedded with the populace of the same culture, language, and customs. While early troop commitments cannot be avoided, once this security condition is set it can be held by an indigenous force to alleviate the need for occupying force requirements.

The three streams of classical counterinsurgency: pacification, winning hearts and

minds, and denial of sanctuary provide indirect access to the enemy's center of gravity

through the critical vulnerability of information.[38]  Once again, a paradox applies, "the best

weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot."[39]  As one of the critical elements of national

power, information must be used to assist in marginalizing the enemy.  Unfortunately the

insurgent has proven to be much more adept at this process, taking a cause and exploiting it

through the efficient use of propaganda.[40]  To counter this, information operations must

move simultaneously in two directions.  Using Iraq as an example, information campaigns

must specifically target the many microclimates[41] of sectarian, ethnic, and tribal affiliations.[42]

Though this at first seems like a daunting task, it is one of absolute necessity as generalized

information spread over a diverse area may serve to alienate a portion of the population that

believes they are relegated to lower importance.  Secondly, information must target the

American audience.  Too often the success stories are left out or minimized by the

sensationalism of violence or failure.  If the commercial media will not take it upon

themselves to share the positive information, then a means must be offered that circumvents

this filter.  This could be provided by a dedicated media source financed through the

government.  While this may at first be taken as positive propaganda not representative of the

actual situations in Iraq, this could be quickly discredited by maintaining the level of

transparency.  Every caution must be taken to preserve the credibility of the source as being

truthful.

Exacting the target location to apply pressure is essential in counterinsurgencies

where missing the mark can serve to quickly exacerbate the problem.  A combination of

strategic and operational intelligence must work as the critical underpinning of all efforts

toward fracturing the insurgent's infrastructure.  On the strategic level, the energy and

resources that feed the insurgency must be understood through careful analysis of trends.

With the knowledge, for example, that 68 percent of Al Qaeda recruits join the jihad through

the establishment of friendships,[43] a targeted campaign can focus efforts to sever this

pipeline.  Historical analysis is also essential to understand the background of a problem.

Origins matter in a region such as Iraq where tribal hierarchies supersede sectarian and ethnic

boundaries,[44] and detailed intelligence must be garnered to make informed decisions.  By

expanding the core of experts at the strategic level of intelligence, the single point failures

can be avoided.  Rather than the informed few providing this critical information to the

decision maker, a consensus could be developed into courses of action.[45]

The operational level of intelligence is equally complex but requires a different

approach.  Where the strategic level requires an analysis of history and trends, the operational

level is much more personal.  As previously discussed, living and working with the

indigenous forces will serve to open the pathway to information.  However, beyond this,

there is a need to develop the capacity of human intelligence (HUMINT).  A process that is

demanding of time and personnel resources, military-to-military contacts and regional

experts must be given the highest priority in all service transformation programs.  This comes

contrary to the typical officer promotion pipelines which mandate diversity in professional

background as a necessity for promotion.  Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) should be

considered a valuable resource worth protecting and should not feel as though they are taking

risks with their careers by accepting appointments to positions of great importance.[46]

The U.S. Army has long followed the time-tested principles formally established in

its doctrine, but problematic situations can develop where doctrine restricts original thought

and action. An insurgency that is not hampered by the formality of restrictive procedures can easily adopt new tactics that circumvent predictable actions. Capitalizing on exceptional leadership at its lower ranks, the Army must allow for more autonomy of thought and action to shorten the learning curve and response time to the insurgent's ever-changing game plan.[47] This idea is captured in the paradox that states "most of the important decisions are not made by generals."[48] Dr. Kilcullen points out that all insurgencies are case-dependent and there is no universally acceptable solution to the problem. It is the soldier as the day-to-day practitioner of counterinsurgency warfare that will be responsible to generate the innovative practices that best oppose the enemy's actions.[49]

While much of the Army transformation process concerns technology and organization, what is required for a counterinsurgency is rooted in training and education. This educational process is one that cannot be hurried along to make up for lost time. Rather, there is a need to shift priorities toward raising the bar of educational competence. Leadership development must be altered to include ethics, cultural sensitivity, and language skills in order to give the soldier the tools needed in an exceedingly complex environment.[50] Time is, however, a limited resource. As battlefield technology has become more sophisticated, the soldier has had to spend increasingly more time mastering the systems and skills needed to employ weapons systems. In the current manning situation it is extremely difficult to pull an individual off the line to allow the opportunities of expanded education.

The educational problem may have to be raised as an issue to be taken outside the military. Rather than lowering the standards for enlistment, action should be taken to raise the baseline competence of the recruiting pool. A congressional mandate may be needed to drive programs in grade schools and high schools that set higher standards of culture and

language education. Arabic, Chinese, or Spanish may at first seem appropriate for the problems we face in the world today, but there is no need to mandate a specific language skill. Simply exposing people to another culture will serve to instill the traits of sensitivity that are called for. As the pipeline for junior leadership, commissioning programs should take this one step further. Navy officer educations for some time have required calculus and physics as part of an education to help ensure competence in an increasingly technical service. Similarly, a higher level of language proficiency must be required of officers to ensure services are prepared for counterinsurgency warfare.

The area of education for personnel already in the service can be addressed as well. All services place equal importance on attaining a higher education in both the enlisted and officer ranks. Counterinsurgency warfare, which was given lower priority for much of the cold war,[51] is now regaining its prominence in education. Recent lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan combined with the historical lessons of conflicts such as Vietnam and El Salvador are now being incorporated into the war college curriculums. However, few officers, and even fewer enlisted, have the opportunities to attend service schools and instead seek out educations on their own. By creating incentives for these individuals to obtain language skills as part of their educations the services will sharpen their capabilities to deal with the problems of today's warfare environment.

**How the Proposed Changes Will Work**

The War on Terrorism is a misnomer that has driven the methods by which we combat the problems of an insurgency.[52] Efforts have largely focused on combat effectiveness where it was assumed a force of superior technology would prevail. However, pacification, winning hearts and minds, and denial of sanctuary are best achieved through

human interaction.  Though the center of gravity is shifted away from the battlefield to become more social and political in nature,[53] it is the military that must go through the most extensive evolution to retain effectiveness.  As the organization with the largest budget and manpower resources, the military will be leaned upon to do more than just maintain physical security.  "That is not the role of the military" is not an acceptable answer when called upon as a service member to perform in diplomatic and political roles.  The battlefield is not separated from the public; rather, the military is constantly engaged in full view of the population.  Decisions made and actions taken at the very lowest levels in this environment are extremely visible and may have impact all the way up to the strategic level.  This idea is reflected in a junior officer's statement about a situation in Iraq, "I was never given classes on how to sit down with a sheik that 2 days before I had seen his face [*sic*] on CNN, and now all of a sudden I am talking to this guy face-to-face."[54]

Dr. Kilcullen uses what are referred to as a series of feedback loops to diagram how actions exacerbate the problems of an insurgency.[55]  Figure 1 is a simplification of one of these loops which shows resistance to the occupation.[56]  Using this as an example we can see how the realignment of efforts discussed in this paper can help to counter the energy that feeds an insurgency.  First, the use of indigenous forces will have positive effect in several areas.  In terms of national pride, the assumption of responsibility for the security of their homeland will have an uplifting effect by restoring ownership of their own situation. Additionally, by closing the disconnect with the local population there will be a faster and more appropriate response to individual and group grievances as problems will be better understood.  Secondly, dedicating resources to a more robust information campaign targeting the specific microclimates of a complex region such as that in Iraq will counter the negative

propaganda which fuels and insurgency. The use of strategic and operational intelligence will alleviate grievances and offences to religion by developing more refined responses to problems. Actions taken with both hard and soft power will become more surgical in an environment where haphazard and generalized application of pressure can create more problems than existed at the outset. Lower level autonomy of action and a more educated force will have a positive effect across the board by creating personnel that are sensitive to the importance of their actions. Better decisions will be made in a more timely manner on a battlefield where constant adaptation is key. As these actions take place the popular support for the insurgency is lessened, and energy is diverted away from the cycle causing the insurgent activity to subside.

Other feedback loops and interaction points would see positive effects as well. For example, the socio-economic dislocation cycle, which feeds a great deal of the insurgent activity,[57] would be interrupted by narrowing the disconnect with the population. This would happen in the proposed changes through indigenous forces, better intelligence, and smarter soldiers who are better equipped to deal with a complicated society.



Figure 1: Feedback Loop

Similarly, referencing Figure 2, we can see how the proposed changes would affect the insurgencies' operational center of gravity.[58] As in the past, retaining the capability to attack and detain insurgents with both the occupation and indigenous militaries creates difficulty for the insurgency to conduct business in the shelter of the population. By leveraging the indigenous side of this equation this effect is multiplied through indirect access as well. Having a security force that is familiar with the culture makes it more



Figure 2: Center of Gravity

difficult for the insurgent to blend in, and the avenue to intelligence and information will flow with less restriction. Though the enemy can spread propaganda easily, the legitimacy of the source can be discounted by leveraging soft forms of national power through information operations. Additionally, the insurgency objective can be attacked directly by media promoting the positive side of the story to the American public. Although the war will still likely be protracted in nature, this information will strengthen the resolve of the public to stay behind the war effort. As mentioned in the feedback loop, intelligence will assist in

weakening the insurgency infrastructure by zeroing in on the best methods by which to attack. Finally, independence of action with lower-level leadership based on solid understanding of complex problems will effectively shrink the area in which the insurgent can operate. By dedicating effort to education we will develop a perceptive soldier in command of delicate situations, and this individual will be more likely to choose a timely and appropriate course of action.

In counterinsurgency warfare "where ambiguity rules and superior firepower does not necessarily guarantee success"[59] there is the realization that it will be people, and not technology, that make the greatest difference in this war. Because this war is not fought on the traditional battlefield, and is instead waged in a population, there is a need to prioritize efforts toward strengthening the civil-military connection. The Marine Corps has for some time realized this type of warfare is more than a military problem. The Corps' Small Wars Manual published in 1940 states "the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, and social."[60] While these ideas are not new, they have not been given the attention they deserve. Not appreciating the complexity of the problem and dedicating all efforts toward the enemy's center of gravity will only prolong the conflict and make it more difficult to retain the will of the American public.

# ENDNOTES

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

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